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NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN THE OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM VII CAMPAIGN
. . . using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established . . . the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed -and when it might be counterproductive. balance proportionality of actions and the means used to discriminate in the use of force during counterinsurgent operations. It will examine some of the special challenges faced by staffs working in a counterinsurgent environment, and it will offer guidance to those who may find themselves in such a position. The essay will be divided into five main sections. The first section highlights the difficulty of these operations by describing a typical example from field experience. The second section will explain the background and history of the CJTF-76 mission during OEF VII and review the applicable LOAC principles commanders and staffs must consider as force is applied.
The third section will explore the targeting process employed by the CJTF-76 staff and command group. The fourth section will explore time sensitive targeting in the context of FM 3-24. Finally, the fifth section will provide scenarios from OEF VII as illustrations of the time sensitive targeting process during a counterinsurgency.
II. Strategic and Operational Dilemmas in Counterinsurgency: An Example.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets track a high value target into a multiple building compound on the outskirts of a local Afghan village. The target is a high level leader of an active Taliban network with numerous subordinate cells, coordinating the flow of logistics and finances for the Taliban. He is also credited with leading and coordinating numerous operations against coalition forces operating in the province. In fact, active intelligence gathering indicated the target coordinated an ambush on coalition forces less than 10 kilometers from the compound just two days before. Coalition forces suffered two killed in action and five wounded during the engagement. Intelligence analysts monitoring the ISR through full motion video (FMV) determine there are at least twenty-five military-age males moving in and out of the compound. Analysts also indicate women and children may be in the compound.
There is reason to believe the compound has been used as a command and control node by the target in the past. ISR indicates the target is likely in the largest building in the compound. Joint fires, including B2 bombers, are in position to strike the compound on the joint task force (JTF) commander's order.
As the JTF commander reviews these facts, his mind turns back to several incidents in the past 90 days. achieving military objectives is difficult even in the most traditional force on force conventional warfare, the complexity of counterinsurgency increases the difficulty of discrimination in myriad ways.
III. Background and History
The international community has recognized that in modern warfare, civilians have borne a terrible burden. This has led to the establishment of laws generically referred to as the "law of armed conflict" (LOAC) which recognizes the immunity of civilians and mandates parties to an armed conflict to adhere to the rules seeking to regulate warfare. 3 The United States historically has affirmed this recognition. The situation in Afghanistan represented the classic insurgency as described in General, 10 th Mountain Division (LI) determined had to be countered decisively during OEF VII. 14 Despite the lack of a strategic campaign plan for the Afghanistan theater of operations, the Division staff developed a comprehensive operational campaign plan to be executed during the year-long deployment as the joint task force headquarters.
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The plan centered on four named operations to improve security in Afghanistan, support the GoA at the national, provincial, and local levels, and improve the country's infrastructure.
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The named operations were Operations Mountain Lion, Thrust, Fury, and
Eagle. 17 They were designed and executed to extend the lines of operations of security, governance, and reconstruction into remote areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan to counter gains previously made by Taliban insurgents. The strategy employed by the CJTF to prosecute counterinsurgency actions during each named operation was to clear, hold, build, and engage. 18 The Commanding General and senior leadership of the CJTF identified the people of Afghanistan and the GoA as the centers of gravity during execution of the campaign plan. 19 The methodology employed by the CJTF highlighted the critical necessity of separating the people from the insurgents during counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, operations affecting the Afghan civilian populace would carry significant consequences during the execution of the campaign plan.
Application of force during counterinsurgency operations carries with it the almost certain risk of unintended harm and damage to civilians and civilian property.
Operations conducted during OEF VII were no different in this respect. Since the ongoing support and trust of the Afghan people was crucial to the success of the CJTF mission, the CJTF Commanding General and staff focused efforts during operations on minimizing harm and damage to civilians and civilian property. 20 
LOAC Principles
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the subsequent four 1949
Geneva Conventions along with the two Geneva 1977 Additional Protocols generally comprise the body of international law which seeks to regulate armed conflict between warring parties. 21 The four conventions are applicable to international armed conflict between states. Common article 3 is widely accepted to apply to internal armed conflicts. 22 The Supreme Court has ruled that the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda is not international armed conflict. 23 However, Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions speaks to internal armed conflict between a state and nonstate actors within its borders and although the United States has signed but not ratified either of the Additional Protocols, it treats the provisions as customary international law which gives them equivalent status in the international community. 24 Conversely, the LOAC mandates combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population when engaged in military operations and attacks. 31 Additional Protocol I defines a civilian as one who does not generally fit the category of those individuals outlined above who engage in hostilities and are prohibited from being the object of attack. 32 An important caveat to this general rule outlined in AP I provides commanders the ability to consider attacking military objectives even though civilians are present. 33 The precise words of this caveat are critical to commanders conducting Article 57 -Precautions in attack 1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
a. Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
i. Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
ii. Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
iii. Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; (1) sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is; (2) the more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted;
and (3) sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. 46 While considering these paradoxes, the commander is urged, nonetheless, to use the appropriate level of force while conducting operations. 47 Additionally, Appendix E of the manual offers general insights for commanders to consider when employing air strikes against the enemy during counterinsurgency operations. does not prescribe a scientific blueprint for targeting, it does provide considerations worth reviewing for those directing operations. Specifically, the appendix reminds commanders that accurate, actionable intelligence combined with timely and precisely delivered ordnance which achieves the desired effect while mitigating adverse effects can be of "enormous value in COIN operations." 54 Precision ordnance is not a foolproof safeguard against unintended collateral damage and civilian casualties. 55 The JTF Commander and staff must, however, keep the long view in the forefront during the TST process. Accordingly, before directing a TST be engaged from the air, the JTF 
